Political scientists and constitutional engineers have recommended various power sharing models to guarantee political stability in multiethnic societies. The literature on power sharing seems to suggest that consociationalism and centripetalism are the two prominent models. While the former suggests grand coalition, the latter recommends multiethnic coalition cabinets to share power in diverse societies. Keeping in view these models, this paper attempts to examine the performance of various coalition cabinets in post-1971 Pakistan. The evidence shows that the coalition cabinets in Pakistan remained short-lived. The Pakistani experience seems to suggest that the power sharing models have certain limitations in diverse societies and are not, necessarily, appropriate option for all multiethnic states.
Introduction
The multiethnic structure of a state has been regarded as an obstacle to a stable democracy (Lijphart, 1995, p.854; Mill, 1958, p. 230) . So, the political scientists have been remained busy in probing a democratic model that can ensure political stability in diverse societies. Since 1960s, power sharing has been considered as a dominant approach by political scientists to pledge political stability in such societies. But, the power sharing is a broad concept and it covers different approaches. The two prominent approaches of power sharing are consociationalism and centripetalism. (Note 1) The former is developed and defended by Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz advocates the latter. Interestingly, the proponents of both approaches, consociationalism and centripetalism, has noticed the lack of power sharing in the multiethnic society of Pakistan. Horowitz (1985: P.365 ) opined that political violence in Pakistan is the outcome of political exclusion. He has enlisted Pakistan with the plural societies that experienced such violence. (Note 2) He elaborated that when a party of one group retains power for an indefinite period and the party of other group remains in opposition indefinitely, this situation promotes the 'feelings of exclusion' in the latter group. He suggested conciliatory governance and the politics of compromise in divided societies. He believed that multiethnic arrangements could promote a 'sense of power-sharing' (Horowitz, 1985: P.365) . Multiethnic arrangements may come in various forms. Horowitz has classified multiethnic coalitions into three broad categories: a coalition of convenience; a coalition of commitment; and a permanent coalition of ethnic parties (alliance). (Note 3) In contrast, , the two most prominent members of consociational school of thought at the moment, have suggested that Pakistan "will need to adopt and maintain consociational governance at federal centre" to "practice democracy". (Note 4) Subsequently, Adeney (2009) has asserted that Pakistani federation's incapacity to manage ethnic diversity is the consequence of its nonconsociational features. For the political incorporation and accommodation of marginalised groups, consociationalism suggests grand coalition cabinets to ensure power sharing in multiethnic societies.
While both approaches suggest power sharing for the multiethnic society of Pakistan, it is important to analyse the politics of power sharing in Pakistan. This investigation, in turn, will explore the relevancy of grand coalition and/or multiethnic alliances with the multiethnic society of Pakistan.
The next section will briefly introduce the multiethnicity of Pakistan. The third section will explore the power sharing arrangements in detail. The final section examines why coalitions fall apart in the case of Pakistan.
Multiethnic Society of Pakistan

Ethno-linguistic Composition of Pakistan
Pakistan is a multiethnic state. It is composed of four provinces, federal capital, and federally administered tribal areas (FATA). Each of its provinces is a homeland of more than one ethno linguistic groups. Punjabis and Siraikis are based in Punjab. Sindh is the homeland of Sindhis and Mohajirs, Urdu speaking community that migrated from India in 1947 and mostly settled in urban centres of Sindh. Pashtuns and Hindko-speaking community are residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Balochs and Pashtuns are major communities settled in Balochistan. A complete description of ethno-linguist composition of Pakistan is given in the table 1. Sindhis have also protested against the centralization of political power. The first Sindhis' resentment appeared on the separation of Karachi from Sindh when it was declared as the capital of Pakistan. Likewise Balochs, Sindhis protested against the one-unit scheme in 1950s. But, the most prominent political mobilization took place in 1980s against the policies of Zia-ul-Haq. It have been noted that during the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1980s, at least 300 Sindhis were killed.
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Pashtuns have also protested at various juncture of Pakistan's history. The first Pashtun resentment was a reaction to the dismissal of Dr. Khan's nationalist government in 1947. Then, the Pashtuns resisted against the one-unit scheme in 1950s. The third Pashtun mobilization resulted from the dismissal of NAP-JUI government, the ban of NAP, and the arrest of Wali Khan in 1970s.
Since 1980s, the urban Sindh has witnessed some severe ethnic clashes between Mohajirs and other ethnic groups. The situation of law and order has been remained deteriorated in Karachi. MQM, the prominent political party of Mohajirs, has joined various coalition cabinets but the situation of unrest in urban Sindh remained unchanged.
To sum up, Pakistan has witnessed a variety of political mobilizations along ethnic lines. Resultantly, despite their limited strength and scope, these protests caused political instability and chaos in Pakistan. Pakhtunkhwa has extended its support to the two factions of Muslim League: PML-N and PML-Q. The Urdu speaking community has voted for the MQM. However, the imperative finding is that Pakistani society is not a case of deeply divided society. The mainstream parties enjoy support of all ethno linguistic groups. A detailed description of party votes by linguistic groups is given in the table # 2. 
Political Boundaries of various Ethno Linguistic Groups
Insert
Politics of Power sharing in Pakistan
Power sharing arrangements has remained short-lived in Pakistan. It seems that the politicians are not capable to address the mutual differences. They remained unable to accommodate each other in coalition politics. This section evaluates the power-sharing experiences in the post-1971 Pakistan. Various episodes have been discussed in subsequent sections.
Power sharing Accord between PPP and NAP-JUI
Awami League of Sheikh Mujib had a complete success in the eastern wing of Pakistan, in the first general elections of Pakistan's history in 1970. In contrast, the mandate in western wing remained divided. Though Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was the leading party in West Pakistan, by winning 85 out of 144 seats, its success was almost completely confined to the two majority provinces of the Punjab and Sindh. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, the National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat-ul-Ulama Islam (JUI) emerged as the major parties. This accord was considered a good sign for the future of democratic rule in Pakistan. However, the suspicions regarding the centre-province relationship and the delegation of authority to elected governments remained alive. Bhutto and Wali Khan presented their own interpretations in press conferences about the most important clauses of the accord. (Note 7) To resolve the disputes, a second round of the meetings was held in April at Peshawar. Initially, the meeting remained fruitless. However, after several meetings, a new agreement was signed on April 27, 1972. In this agreement, Bhutto had offered two federal ministries to NAP/JUI, and agreed to appoint governors in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on recommendations of the NAP/JUI.
Insert Table 3: "Party Position in Federal and Provincial Elections 1970" here
As a result of this accord, the NAP and JUI, the majority parties in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were invited to form governments in their respective provinces. In addition, Bhutto appointed governors in these two provinces on the recommendation of NAP and JUI. Bhutto advised the governors to guarantee fair treatment for all inhabitants of province. In his letters to governors, he directed the governors to preserve integrity of the state, to maintain law and order situation, and not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the central government. The letters to the governors were published expecting that it will endure the agreement. But, to J R Paterson (1972) , "whatever the reasons, the publication of these letters and the general tone of the press conference do not contribute very much friendly relations between the centre and provinces in the future". This tripartite accord worked only for a short period. The 'politics of accommodation' was broken down soon. The federal government sacked NAP's government in Balochistan on the grounds that it was working against the integrity of the state. The NAP/JUI coalition government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa resigned as a protest against this dismissal of Balochistan government (Mushtaq, 2009 ).
However, the neutral observers discarded the contention of central government that the minority provinces were involved in anti state activities. Imray (1976) wrote, "On Balochistan there was unanimous opinion that even the most extreme opponents of the government were not separatists. They wanted to remain a part of Pakistan but with greater autonomy. The alternatives -joining Iran or Afghanistan or becoming independent state were never seriously considered". (Note 8) Similarly, it has been argued that there was no reality in the Pashtunistan issue in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In his annual report defence attaché of British embassy in Pakistan wrote," the Pashtunistan issue has caused no real difficulty. While it is always easy to find Pathans (Pashtuns) who will decry Pakistan and the government, they are not so ready to offer any real alternative and seem content to get as much as they can for their people without sacrificing their traditional feelings for independence". (Note 9)
To sum up, the tripartite accord came to an end. The Supreme Court banned the NAP through a judicial decision. Wali Khan was jailed on the grounds that his party was involved in anti state activities. A military operation underwent in Balochistan to suppress the uprising. This operation continued for several years . The mutual hostility of government and the opposition parties provided the military another opportunity to take over. Resultantly, in July 1977, the Bhutto government was overthrown through a coup d'état, led by Zia-ul-Haq. The parliament was dissolved, the political parties were banned and the 1973 constitution was suspended. Post-Zia Era (1988-99) During Zia period , the normal political process remained suspended. The people of Pakistan have to wait until 1985 for the general elections. However, these elections were party less. Through constitutional amendment, Zia had gained the authority to appoint prime minister. Therefore, his nominee, Muhammad Khan Junejo installed his government in 1985. Junejo government survived for a short period and it was dismissed by Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. A new episode of parliamentary politics started after the death of Zia-ul-Haq in August 1988. The post-Zia era witnessed a number of coalition cabinets. But, these coalitions or alliances survived only for short periods. The evaluation of these alliances reveals that the spirit of accommodation remained missing in these power sharing arrangements.
Coalition Politics of
Insert Table 4 : "National Assembly General Elections (1988 Elections ( -1993 "here In the federal elections of 1988, Pakistan People's Party surfaced as a major party at national level by securing 93 national assembly seats out of the 207 seats. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of PPP 'initiated conciliation with all the important political groups in the country' (Rais, 1989) . Though the PPP emerged as the leading party, it had to offer partnership to other parties for the simple majority in the house. IJI was the major rival of PPP; therefore it made contact with the smaller regional parties i.e. Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Awami National Party (ANP). MQM, a regional party of Sindh joined the coalition government of PPP at national level an in the province of Sindh. This alliance was very crucial because the province of Sindh was politically divided between PPP and MQM. This division was along rural-urban lines. The PPP enjoyed electoral support in the Sindhi speaking rural Sindh by getting all National Assembly seats in the Sindhi-speaking region and the MQM dominated in the Mohajir constituencies of Karachi and Hyderabad by winning majority of seats. This trend continued in the provincial results of Sindh also (Kennedy, 1991) . So the cooperation between PPP and MQM was viewed as a 'success story of mediation concerning the conflict of interests between urban and rural Sindh' (Rais, 1989) . ANP, a regional party of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, entered into an alliance with PPP at national level and in the province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (Note 10) However, PPP remained unable to install coalition government in the vital province of Punjab. In Punjab, IJI had succeeded to install its government. (Note 11) Nawaz Sharif, the major rival of PPP succeeded in becoming chief minister of Punjab. Therefore, Benazir had the challenges to deal with the coalition partners in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the rival ministry in Punjab.
PPP and MQM signed a 59-point accord that is popularly known as Karachi Declaration on December 2, 1988. It was hoped that the friendly relations between PPP and MQM would endorse the law and order situation in Karachi. However, the coalition partners, PPP and MQM, remained unable to address the mutual grievances. They were unable to resolve the conflict between the rural and urban Sindh. Consequently, the alliance was collapsed.
According to MQM, the PPP government dishonoured the agreement. Ignoring the mohajir community, it started pro-Sindhi policies in Sindh. Consequently, MQM withdrew its support to federal government and supported the IJI-led no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto in October 1989. This move of MQM resulted in bitter clashes in Sindh between the supporters of MQM and PPP. After its separation from the coalition government, MQM entered into an alliance with IJI. MQM and IJI signed an accord with almost same clauses that had its predecessor (Kennedy, 1991).
Ghulam Ishaq Khan, then the president of Pakistan, dissolved Benazir government in 1990. (Note 12) Mid-term elections were held in October 1990. IJI won these elections and also drew support from the regional parties, namely MQM and ANP. IJI, a coalition of nine parties got enough support to form its government in Islamabad. It also remained successful to install its government in the vital province of Punjab. In Balochistan, IJI installed a coalition government with the regional parties. It also installed coalition governments in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. It has been observed that the regional parties joined different alliances at different times. (Note 13) Nevertheless, there decision to support a particular alliance/ party remained 'always qualified and based on self interest' (Ziring, 1990 ). This time, it was not an easy task for Nawaz Sharif to keep mutually hostile parties together as coalition partners. The coalition partners had different backgrounds and ideologies. ANP, the successor of NAP and the descendant of the Khudai Khidmatgar Tehrik of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was a strange bedfellow for Pakistan Muslim League.
Similarly, Jamat Islami (JI) and MQM had been involved in mutual attacks. Furthermore, JI, MQM, ANP, and PML had different vision over issues like foreign policy, Kashmir dispute, and Pak-Afghan relationships (Waseem, 1992; Talbot, 2005) . Consequently, the coalition began to disintegrate soon. Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the IJI government in 1993 but it was restored through the verdict of Supreme Court. However, the political chaos resulted in the resignations of prime minister and the president.
Pakistan witnessed another general election in 1993. The PML and PPP emerged as the leading parties in general elections of 1993 by securing 72 and 86 seats respectively, in the National Assembly of 207 seats. The salient feature of this election was that the regional parties of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan suffered defeats. The Islamic parties also remained unable to attract the electorate. MQM boycotted the elections of National Assembly as protest against the military's operation clean up. However, it participated in the provincial elections and continued to maintain its electoral support in Karachi by winning 22 of the 28 Provincial Assembly seats. The election results suggested that Pakistan was moving toward a two-party system and PPP and PML-N made notable inroads into the provinces (Amin, 1994) . PPP, the leading party in National Assembly, succeeded in forming a coalition government at federal level and in the province of Punjab with PML-J. It also remained successful in setting-up its government in Sindh. However, in the province of NWFP, PML-N and ANP installed their coalition government. The evidence shows that this episode of coalition cabinets also suffered from internal disputes and mutual rivalry. The relations between PML-J and PPP remained problematic in Islamabad and Punjab. For example, in Punjab, PPP had given the office of chief minister to its junior coalition partner, PML-J. But, it attempted to discharge Manzoor Watto, then the chief minister of Punjab to install its own chief minister. However, PML-J resisted this attempt and PPP could only manage to replace Manzoor Watto by a much weaker figure of the same party, Sardar Arif Nakai (Talbot, 2005) . The relations between coalition partners in Islamabad were also not friendly. The mutual distrust of the coalition partners resulted in another political turmoil. Farooq Leghari, then the president of Pakistan, dissolved the government of Benazir Bhutto in 1996.
The results of the general elections of 1997 were amazing in Pakistan. PML-N got a tremendous victory. Since 1985, it was for the first time that a party possessed an absolute majority in the National Assembly. It was also for the first time that a Punjab based party made significant inroads in rural Sindh, the stronghold of PPP. Ethno-regional parties' performance remained mix: ANP and MQM captured 9 and 12 seats respectively in the National Assembly. BNP and JWP, the two Baloch nationalist parties, won 3 and 2 seats respectively. The JUI-F was the only religious party with two members in the National Assembly (Talbot, 2005) .
Insert Table 5: "Party Position in National and Provincial General Elections 1997"here
Despite of its absolute majority, PML-N entered into an alliance with the regional parties of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. It installed coalition government in Islamabad and in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh with ANP and MQM respectively. As a result, PPP, the largest party in the Sindh Assembly became the opposition party. However, it is argued that the coalition failed to work and did not provide 'effective governance' (Syed, 1998) . The relations between the coalition partners in Sindh were not pleasant. Even, MQM occasionally 'organized protest marches and strikes to press the government for the implementation of the agreement of cooperation they had signed in February 1997'. Afterwards, MQM's ministers resigned from the central and provincial cabinets (Rizvi, 1999) . ANP, the coalition partner in Islamabad and in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, also left the coalition as a protest against the PML-N's refusal to rename NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa. Both parties, ANP and MQM, accused "Nawaz Sharif of establishing Punjab's hegemony over the smaller provinces and violating the latter's rights and interests" (Rizvi, 2000) . This perception was underpinned by the central governments unilateral decision to revive the Kalabagh dam project. The provincial assemblies of Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan had passed resolution against this project already. The nationalist groups and parties from the smaller provinces vowed to defend their right of self-rule. Some suggested a new constitution framed by a constituent assembly with equivalent representation of all provinces (Rizvi, 1999) . Meanwhile, Pakistan's Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), a group of 28 ethno-regional parties was launched during 1998 and this association continued to protest against allegedly authoritarian rule and for 'the establishment of a decentralized polity' (Rizvi, 2000) . Afterwards, Nawaz Sharif was removed by the military and Pervez Musharraf took over the charge in October 1999.
Mutual Accommodation during Musharraf period
After the general elections of 2002, the political parties were divided into two camps: pro-Musharraf and anti-Musharraf. A pro-Musharraf coalition government (PML-Q, National Alliance and MQM) was installed after the elections in Islamabad. PML-Q installed its government in Punjab, and managed to form coalition governments in Sindh and Balochistan with MQM and MMA respectively. MMA, the leading party, formed its government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Insert Table 6: "Party Position in National and Provincial General Elections 2002"here
It was for the first time in recent history of Pakistan that coalition governments completed their specified parliamentary tenure. However, the regime's stability was possible because of the Musharraf's active contribution in keeping the coalition intact. In addition, Musharraf kept Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto outside the game of politics. However, this attempt led the opponents of the past to come close to each other. In London, the both leaders signed the "Charter of Democracy". In the charter, they agreed to work together for the restoration of democratic rule in Pakistan.
Politics of Reconciliation in post-Musharraf era
In October 2007, Musharraf was elected for his second five-year presidential term. This controversial presidential election was followed by general elections for the National Assembly and the four Provincial Assemblies. In the general elections of 2008, PPP and PML-N emerged as the leading political parties by winning 88 and 67 seats respectively in the National Assembly. The number of seats rose up to 122 for PPP and 91 for PML-N as a result of the allocation of reserved seats for women and joining of independently elected members to these parties. In the province of Punjab, PML-N was the leading party. PPP succeeded in getting a clear majority in the province of Sindh. However, MQM dominated the urban Sindh and secured 25 seats of the National Assembly. In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ANP got victory. PML-Q appeared as the largest party in Balochistan. The broad-based coalition government at the centre included PPP, PML-N, ANP, MQM, and MMA. It has been argued that this coalition was only one of its kinds in Pakistan as it was 'the broadest-ever coalition of political parties' in the Pakistan's history (Rizvi, 2008) .
Insert Table 7: "Results of General Elections 2008"
here PPP and PML-N decided to share power in the Bhurban declaration. This declaration was considered as a great move towards conciliatory politics in Pakistan. (Note 14) However, the durability of these power-sharing arrangements was in question due to the past antagonism between the two parties. Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, a former speaker of National Assembly and PPP leader from Southern Punjab, headed the PPP-led coalition. In the election of Prime Minister Ship, he scored 264 of 306 votes polled for this election. After his election, Gillani put together the coalition cabinet. The cabinet ministries were distributed among the coalition partners, more or less, according to their numerical strength in the National Assembly. Initially, out of the total 24 positions, 11 were given to the PPP, 9 to the PML-N, 3 to the junior coalition partners (ANP and JUI-F), and 1 to an independent candidate (Kronstadt, 2008) .
It was an only one of its kind practice in Pakistan that a grand coalition government was installed in Islamabad. The coalition was comprised of the two mainstream political parties (PPP and PML-N), two regional political parties (ANP and MQM), and an Islamic party (JUI-F). For the moment, these parties over come the mutual differences to refurbish the civilian political rule in Pakistan. Apparently, the political leadership seemed convinced that their split will benefit the non-democratic powers (Rizvi, 2008) . However, the mutual understanding proved short-lived. PML-N, left the coalition government over the dispute of reinstatement of the depose judges. So, the six-week old grand coalition came to an end. The cabinet ministers of PML-N submitted their resignation letters to the Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani on May 12, 2008. (Note 15) However, the party declared that it would continue its 'issue-based support' to the government. (Note 16) Finally, PML-N decided to leave the governing coalition completely and sat in the opposition.
At provincial level, PPP and PML-N entered into an alliance in Punjab. Though, still the coalition government is functioning in Punjab but the relationships between the coalition partners are not pleasant. The PPP leadership have certain reservations about the Punjab's government treatment with the party. In Sindh, MQM and ANP are coalition partners in the PPP-led coalition government. MQM and ANP are involved in the mutual attacks in Karachi. In addition, MQM and PPP have difference of opinion over various issues. MQM has been reiterated that it would leave the coalition government if the provincial government continued its policy of ignoring the MQM. However, the situation is different in the minority provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The coalition government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has successfully managed to overcome the mutual differences. More or less, there is a complete consensus between coalition partners, PPP and ANP, over vital issues and policies. The coalition government of Balochistan is also functioning smoothly. Recently, the JUI and MQM have left the coalition. So, the federal coalition government that was once comprised of five political parties is now consisting of only two parties, PPP and ANP.
This story seems to suggest that the politics of power sharing in post-Musharraf era also resulted into failure. The grand coalition at the federal centre existed for a few weeks and the coalition partners in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh are involved in mutual antagonism.
Some concluding remarks
It is important to explore why coalitions fall apart in Pakistan? The analysis of the power-sharing arrangements in Pakistan seems to suggest that political culture of Pakistan is no more conducive for such arrangements. The summary of coalition cabinets displays that these coalitions remained short-lived. Neither multiethnic nor grand coalition survived in Pakistan. The evidence shows that there is no single factor responsible for the collapse of coalitions in Pakistan. The coalitions, normally, disintegrate as a result of internal disputes. It has been argued that two factors are crucial for the durability and resilience of coalitions. First, the potential of coalition parties' to discipline their members and second, the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to manage mutual disagreements (Muller & Strom, 2000) . Table 8 : "Summary of Coalition cabinets (1988 Coalition cabinets ( -2008 " here In Pakistan, the leadership plays key role in decision making pertaining to the entering or leaving an alliance in Pakistan. So, the discipline of party members has nothing to do with the collapse of coalitions in Pakistan. However, the failure of mechanisms, such as committees and agreements, are responsible for the disintegration of various coalitions in Pakistan. Coalitions of MQM and ANP with the mainstream parties collapsed in post-Zia era due to disagreements over the implementation of so-called agreements. Similarly, PML-N left the coalition government over the dispute of reinstatement of the deposed judges in the last year. These coalitions did not survive due to the lack of mechanisms and channels to override mutual disputes. It is also important to note why political parties enter into coalitions? The theory of coalition formation assumes that there are two main incentives responsible for the coalescence of political parties to join coalition cabinets. First, it is office-related payoffs (Riker 1962) ; and second, it is policy-related payoffs that motivate the political parties to share power (Schofield 1986 ). The Pakistani experience displays that smaller political parties joined coalitions for office-related benefits tied with the cabinet membership. Whether coalition parties wish to influence the policy or hunt for office benefits has clear implications for the survival of a coalition. Therefore, the preference of materialistic benefits over the policy issues resulted in the failure of coalition politics in Pakistan. This illustration seems to suggest that the political culture of Pakistan is no more conducive for power sharing arrangements. Pakistan is a diverse society but it is not deeply divided. The election results, since 1970s, shows that the mainstream parties enjoy considerable electoral support in all ethno-linguistic groups. The previous studies suggest that lack of power sharing (Amin, 1988) and political exclusion (Alqama, 1997) is the key factor in rise and fall of ethno-national movements in Pakistan. But, the history of coalition cabinets illustrates that power sharing it is not a political norm in Pakistan. The power sharing models have certain limitations in diverse societies. Pakistan requires multiethnic parties rather than multiethnic coalitions to share power to smaller ethno-linguistic groups. The mainstream parties should address the grievances of smaller groups to engage them in the mainstream politics. In addition to the power sharing through multiethnic parties at federal level, the autonomy of constituent units in regional matters will strengthen the federation and ensure the political stability in Pakistan. 
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